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Abstract
We consider a game-theoretic model of a market where investors compete for
payoffs yielded by several assets. The main result consists in a proof of the existence
and uniqueness of a strategy, called relative growth optimal, such that the logarithm
of the share of its wealth in the total wealth of the market is a submartingale
for any strategies of the other investors. It is also shown that this strategy is
asymptotically optimal in the sense that it achieves the maximal capital growth
rate when compared to competing strategies. Based on the results obtained, we
study the asymptotic structure of the market when all the investors use the relative
growth optimal strategy.
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finance, martingale convergence.
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1. Introduction
Growth optimal strategies are a well-studied topic in mathematical finance. However,
the majority of models in the literature assume exogenously specified returns of assets
and consider models with a single investor. In this setting growth optimal strategies arise
as solutions of optimization problems (see Algoet and Cover (1988); Breiman (1961);
Karatzas and Kardaras (2007); Platen (2006)). In the present paper we study growth
optimality of investment strategies from a game-theoretic perspective and consider a
model of a market (an asset market game), where several investors compete for random
payoffs yielded by several assets at discrete moments of time on the infinite time interval.
The payoffs are divided between the investors proportionally to shares of assets they buy
at prices determined endogenously by a short-run equilibrium of supply and demand.
As a result, the profit or loss of one investor depends not only on the realized payoffs,
but also on actions of the competitors. In our model we assume that the assets are
short-lived in the sense that they are traded at time t, yield payoffs at t + 1, and then
the cycle repeats. Thus, they can be viewed as some short-term investment projects
rather than, e.g., common stock.
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The goal of the paper is to identify an investment strategy, called relative growth
optimal, such that the logarithm of the relative wealth of an investor who uses it is
a submartingale no matter what the strategies of the other investors are (by relative
wealth we mean the share of wealth of one investor in the total wealth of the market).
In conventional (single-investor, i.e. non-game) market models, it is well-known that the
submartingale property implies various asymptotic optimality properties for the growth
rate of wealth (see, e.g., Algoet and Cover (1988); Karatzas and Kardaras (2007)). Re-
sults of a similar nature turn out to be true in our model as well, though their proofs use
different ideas. In particular, we show that the relative wealth of an investor who uses
the relative growth optimal strategy stays bounded away from zero with probability one.
We also show that if the representative strategy of the other investors is asymptotically
different, then such an investor will dominate in the market – the corresponding share
of wealth will tend to one. In addition, the relative growth optimal strategy maximizes
the growth rate of wealth and forms a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a game where all
investors maximize their expected relative wealth.
Our model extends the model proposed by Amir et al. (2013), who also studied
optimal strategies in an asset market game with short-lived assets. The main difference
between our model and their model is that we assume the presence of a bank account
(or a risk-free asset) with exogenous interest rate. In the simplest form, if the interest
rate is zero, it just gives investors the possibility to put only a part of their wealth in
the assets and to keep a part of wealth in cash. In the model of Amir et al. (2013), it
is assumed that the whole wealth is reinvested in the assets in each time period, and
that model can be obtained from ours if one let the interest rate be −1, so that it is not
reasonable to keep money in the bank. The inclusion of a bank account in the model
leads to a more difficult construction of the optimal strategy. But, at he same time,
it also opens a series of new interesting questions regarding the asymptotic behavior of
the absolute wealth of investors that do not arise in the model where the whole wealth
is reinvested in assets.
Our paper can be reckoned among papers that study long-run performance of in-
vestment strategies from the point of view of evolutionary dynamics, i.e. a market is
considered as a population of various strategies which compete for capital. This ap-
proach can be used to analyze forces that determine long-run market dynamics through
a process of natural selection of investment strategies, see, e.g., the seminal paper by
Blume and Easley (1992), where a model with a discrete probability space was consid-
ered, and its further development (Blume and Easley, 2006). In later works this field
is called Evolutionary Finance; for recent literature reviews, see, e.g., Evstigneev et al.
(2016); Holtfort (2019).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model and introduce
the notion of relative growth optimality of investment strategies. In Section 3, we
construct a relative growth optimal strategy in an explicit form and show that it is
unique in a certain sense. Sections 4 and 5 study further optimality properties of this
strategy. Section 6 is devoted to the analysis of the asymptotics of the absolute wealth
of investors when they use the relative growth optimal strategy.
2. The model
The market in the model consists of M ≥ 2 investors, N ≥ 1 risky assets, and a bank
account (or cash). The assets yield payoffs which are distributed between the investors
at discrete moments of time t = 1, 2, . . . The investors choose, at every moment of time,
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proportions of their wealth they invest in the assets and proportions they keep in the
bank account. The assets live for one period: they are traded at time t, yield payoffs
at t + 1, and then the cycle repeats. Asset prices are determined endogenously by a
short-run equilibrium of supply and demand; in this model, without loss of generality,
we assume that each asset is in unit supply.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space with a filtration F = (Ft)∞t=0 on which all random
variables will be defined. Payoffs of asset n = 1, . . . , N are specified by a random
sequence Xnt ≥ 0, t ≥ 1, which is F-adapted (Xnt is Ft-measurable for all t ≥ 1). It is
assumed that Xnt are given exogenously, i.e. do not depend on actions of the investors.
Return on the bank account is specified by an exogenous F-predictable sequence ρt ≥ 0
(i.e. ρt is Ft−1-measurable), such that ρt− 1 is interpreted as spot interest rate between
moments of time t − 1 and t. Note that the interest rate may be negative. We will
assume that
ρt +
∑
n
Xnt > 0 a.s. for all t ≥ 1 (1)
(otherwise the model may degenerate as will become clear below).
The wealth of investor m is described by an adapted random sequence Y mt ≥ 0. The
quantity Y mt is the budget that this investor can allocate at time t for investment in the
assets and the bank account. We assume that the initial budget Y m0 of each investor is
non-random and strictly positive. The wealth Y mt at moments of time t ≥ 1 depends
on investors’ strategies and the asset payoffs.
A strategy of investor m consists of vectors of investment proportions λmt = (λ
m,1
t ,
. . . , λm,Nt ), t ≥ 1, according to which this investor allocates available budget towards
purchase of assets at time t−1. The proportion 1−∑n λm,nt is allocated in the bank ac-
count. We assume that short sales and borrowing from the bank account are not allowed,
so vectors λt = (λ
m,n
t ) belong to the set ∆ = {λ ∈ RMN+ :
∑
n λ
m,n ≤ 1 for each m}.
At each moment of time, investment proportions are selected by the investors simul-
taneously and independently, so the model represents a simultaneous-move N -person
dynamic game, and the proportion vectors λmt represent the investors’ actions. These
actions may depend on the game history, and we define a strategy Λm of investor m as
a sequence of functions
Λmt (ω, y0, λ1, . . . , λt−1) : Ω× RM+ ×∆t−1 → [0, 1]N , t ≥ 1,
which are Ft−1 ⊗ B(R+ ×∆t−1)-measurable and for all ω, t, y0, λ1, . . . , λt−1 satisfy the
condition ∑
n
Λm,nt (ω, y0, λ1, . . . , λt−1) ≤ 1.
The argument y0 ∈ RM+ corresponds to the vector of initial capital Y0 = (Y 10 , . . . , YM0 ).
The arguments λs = (λ
m,n
s ), m = 1, . . . ,M , n = 1, . . . , N are investment proportions
selected by the investors at past moments of time (for t = 1, the function Λmt (ω, y0)
does not depend on λs). The value of the function Λ
m
t corresponds to the vector of
investment proportions λmt . The measurability of Λ
m
t in ω with respect to Ft−1 means
that future payoffs are not known to the investors at the moment when they decide upon
their actions.
After selection of investment proportions by the investors at time t− 1, equilibrium
asset prices pnt−1 are determined from the market clearing condition that the aggregate
demand of each asset is equal to the aggregate supply, which is assumed to be 1. Since
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investor m can purchase xm,nt = λ
m,n
t Y
m
t−1/p
n
t−1 units of asset n, the asset prices at time
t− 1 should be equal
pnt−1 =
∑
m
λm,nt Y
m
t−1.
If
∑
m λ
m,n
t = 0, i.e. no one invests in asset n, we put p
n
t−1 = 0 and x
m,n
t = 0 for all m.
Thus, investor m’s portfolio between moments of time t − 1 and t consists of xm,nt
units of asset n and cmt := (1 −
∑
n λ
m,n
t )Y
m
t−1 units of cash held in the bank account.
At moment of time t, the total payoff received by this investor from the assets in her
portfolio will be equal to
∑
n x
m,n
t X
n
t and the (gross) return on the bank account will
be ρtc
m
t . Consequently, her wealth is determined by the recursive relation
Y mt = ρt
(
1−
∑
n
λm,nt
)
Y mt−1 +
∑
n
λm,nt Y
m
t−1∑
k λ
k,n
t Y
k
t−1
Xnt , t ≥ 1 (2)
(with 0/0 = 0 in the right-hand side). Here and in what follows, Y mt , Y
m
t−1, ρt, X
n
t are
functions of ω only, and by λm,nt we denote the realization of investor m’s strategy in
this market, which is defined recursively as the predictable sequence
λm,nt (ω) = Λ
m,n
t (ω, Y0, λ1(ω), . . . , λt−1(ω)). (3)
Note that in our model investors’ actions precede asset prices, so investors first
“announce” how much they allocate in each asset, and then the prices are adjusted to
clear the market. This modeling approach is analogous to market games of Shapley–
Shubik type. Although it is a simplification of a real market, such an approach is
economically reasonable (see Shapley and Shubik (1977) for details and justification).
We call (2) the wealth equation, and it is the principal equation in our model. Mainly,
we will be interested not in the absolute wealth Y mt , but in the relative wealth, i.e. the
proportion of wealth of one investor in the total wealth of all investors. The total wealth
is defined as
Wt =
∑
m
Y mt ,
and the relative wealth of investor m is defined as
rmt =
Y mt
Wt
(when Wt = 0, we put r
m
t = 0).
Definition 1. We call a strategy Λm of investor m relative growth optimal if for any
vector of initial capital Y0 (with Y
k
0 > 0 for all k) and strategies Λ
k of the other investors
k 6= m,
ln rmt is a submartingale.
Such a strategy is optimal in several aspects. First, observe that if a strategy is
relative growth optimal, then also rmt is a submartingale by Jensen’s inequality. As
a corollary, it is not hard to see that a strategy profile in which every investor uses
a relative growth optimal strategy is a Nash equilibrium in the game where investors
maximize Ermt at a fixed moment of time t. This follows from the fact that if the
strategies of investors k 6= m are relative growth optimal, then rmt = 1 −
∑
k 6=m r
k
t is
a supermartingale. As we will show in Section 3, a relative growth optimal strategy is
unique, so when every investor uses it, their relative wealth will remain constant.
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Second, as will be shown in Section 5, an investor who uses a relative growth optimal
strategy achieves the highest growth rate of wealth compared to the other investors in
the market. This property is analogous to the growth optimality property in single-
investor market models (Algoet and Cover (1988); Breiman (1961); Kelly (1956); and
others). However, it is essential that we require the logarithm of relative wealth ln rmt
to be a submartingale; the logarithm of wealth lnY mt may be not a submartingale (see
Section 6).
Also, a relative growth optimal strategy belongs to the class of survival strategies,
which plays the central role in Evolutionary Finance (see Evstigneev et al. (2016)) and
is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A strategy Λm of investor m is called survival if for any strategies of the
other investors
inf
t≥0
rmt > 0 a.s.
An investor using a survival strategy cannot be driven out of the market (even
asymptotically) in the sense that her relative wealth always stays bounded away from
zero. In this definition, we use the terminology of Amir et al. (2013); note that, for
example, Blume and Easley (1992) use the term “survival” in a somewhat different
meaning. The fact that a relative growth optimal strategy is survival readily follows
from that ln rmt is a non-positive submartingale, and hence it has a finite limit l =
limt→∞ ln r
m
t a.s. (see, e.g., Chapter 7 of Shiryaev (2019) for this and other results from
the theory of discrete-time martingales used in this paper). Therefore, limt→∞ r
m
t =
el > 0 a.s.
Remark 1 (Relation to the Amir–Evstigneev–Schenk-Hoppe´ model). Our model gen-
eralizes the model of Amir, Evstigneev, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (Amir et al., 2013), where
it was assumed that investors reinvest their whole wealth in assets in each time period.
That model can be obtained as a particular case of our model by taking ρt ≡ 0, so that
it is never reasonable to keep money in the bank account.
However, despite similarity, construction of the optimal strategy in our model turns
out to be more difficult. In particular, the optimal strategy of Amir et al. (2013) is
basic in the sense that its investment proportions do not depend on past actions of
investors, while, as we will see in the next section, in our model they depend on current
wealth of all investors, which depends on their past actions. Moreover, our model opens
interesting questions about the asymptotic behavior of the total wealth of investors,
which do not arise when the whole wealth is reinvested in assets. We consider these
questions in Section 6.
Another model of this kind with short-lived assets and a risk-free asset was considered
by Belkov et al. (2017), where the existence of a survival strategy was established, and
it was also shown that all basic survival strategies are asymptotically equal. However,
in that model asset payoffs depend on “money supply” (amount of capital not invested
in assets) in a special way, which allows to reduce that model to the one of Amir et al.
(2013).
3. Existence and uniqueness of a relative growth optimal strategy
Let us first introduce auxiliary notation and definitions.
We will use the following convenient notation for vectors. If x, y ∈ RN , we will
denote their scalar product by xy =
∑
n x
nyn, the L1-norm by |x| = ∑n |xn|, and the
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L2-norm by ‖x‖ = √xx. If f : R → R is a function, then f(x) denotes the vector
(f(x1), . . . , f(xN )). By a∨ b we will denote the maximum of variables a, b, and by a∧ b
the minimum.
The realization of investor m’s strategy, defined in (3), will be denoted by λmt (ω), and
when it is necessary to emphasize that it depends on the initial capital and strategies
of the other investors we will use the notation λmt (ω;Y0, L), where L = (Λ
1, . . . ,ΛM )
stands for a strategy profile; the argument ω will be often omitted for brevity.
Let us introduce the notion of equality of strategies that will be used to state that
the relative growth optimal strategy is unique. Suppose τ(ω;Y0, L) denotes a family of
random variables, i.e. for any fixed vector of initial capital Y0 and a strategy profile
L = (Λ1, . . . ,ΛM ), the function ω 7→ τ(ω;Y0, L) is F-measurable (and may assume the
value +∞).
Definition 3. We say that two strategies Λm and Λ˜m of investor m are equal in realiza-
tion until τ if for any vector of initial capital Y0 and any strategies of the other investors
Λk, k 6= m, we have the equality of realizations (a.s. for all t ≥ 1)
(λmt (ω;Y0, L)− λmt (ω;Y0, L˜))I(t ≤ τ(ω;Y0, L) ∧ τ(ω;Y0, L˜)) = 0,
where L = (Λ1, . . . ,Λm, . . . ,ΛM ), L˜ = (Λ1, . . . , Λ˜m, . . . ,ΛM ) are the strategy profiles
which differ only in the strategy of investor m.
For example, in Theorem 1 below, we will consider equality until τ = inf{t ≥ 0 :
rmt = 1} – the first moment of time when the relative wealth of an investor reaches 1
(with τ(ω) =∞ if rmt (ω) < 1 for all t), which, considered as a function ω 7→ τ(ω;Y0, L),
is a stopping time for any fixed Y0 and L.
The reason why we need to work with equality until τ is that when the relative
wealth of an investor becomes 1 (and the wealth of the competitors becomes zero), she
may choose any investment proportions and her relative wealth will always remain 1
(provided that she does not invest in a “bad way” losing all her wealth). Hence, it is
not possible to speak about uniqueness after this moment.
Now we can proceed to the construction of the relative growth optimal strategy. Let
Kt(ω,A) : Ω × B(RN+ ) → [0, 1] denote the regular conditional distribution of the payoff
vector Xt = (X
1
t , . . . ,X
N
t ) with respect to Ft−1, so that for each t and fixed ω the
function A 7→ Kt(ω,A) is a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra B(RN+ ), and for
fixed A ∈ B(RN+ ) the function ω 7→ Kt(ω,A) is a version of the conditional probability
P(Xt ∈ A | Ft−1).
Define the sequence of sets Γt ∈ Ft−1 ⊗ B(R+),
Γt =
{
(ω, c) :
∫
R
N
+
cρt(ω)
|x| Kt(ω, dx) > 1
}
, t ≥ 1,
with the following convention: cρt(ω)/|x| = 0 if cρt(ω) = |x| = 0 and cρt(ω)/|x| = +∞
if cρt(ω) > 0 but |x| = 0.
The following lemma will play an auxiliary role in construction of the relative growth
optimal strategy.
Lemma 1. For all t ≥ 1 and (ω, c) ∈ Γt, there exists a unique solution z ∈ (0, c] of the
equation ∫
R
N
+
cρt(ω)
zρt(ω) + |x|Kt(ω, dx) = 1. (4)
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The function ζt(ω, c) defined to be equal to this solution on Γt and equal to zero outside
Γt is Ft−1 ⊗ B(R+)-measurable.
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution for each (ω, c) ∈ Γt is straight-
forward: the left-hand side of (4) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function in
z ∈ (0, c] which assumes a value greater than 1 for z = 0 and a value not greater than 1
for z = c.
To prove the measurability, consider the function f : Ω×R+ × R+ → R,
f(ω, c, z) =
(
2 ∧
∫
R
N
+
cρt(ω)
zρt(ω) + |x|Kt(ω, dx)− 1
)
I((ω, c) ∈ Γt).
Observe that f is a Carathe´odory function, i.e. Ft−1 ⊗B(R+)-measurable in (ω, c) and
continuous in z. Then by Filippov’s implicit function theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 18.17
in Aliprantis and Border (2006)), the set-valued function
φ(ω, c) = {z ∈ [0, c] : f(ω, c, z) = 0}
admits a measurable selector. Since φ on Γt is single-valued (we have φ(ω, c) = {ζt(ω, c)}),
this implies that ζt is Ft−1 ⊗ B(R+)-measurable.
In what follows, we will use the notation χt = (y0, λ1, . . . , λt) ∈ RM+ ×∆t for history
of the market until time t. Denote by Ct(ω, χt) =Wt(ω) = |Yt(ω)| the total wealth of all
investors at time t, where Yt is defined recursively by relation (2) with the given initial
wealth Y0 = y0 and investment proportions λ
m,n
s , which form the history χt.
Theorem 1. The strategy Λ̂ with investment proportions defined by the relation
Λ̂nt (ω, χt−1) =
∫
RN
+
xn
ζt(ω,Ct−1(ω, χt−1))ρt(ω) + |x|Kt(ω, dx) (5)
is relative growth optimal (0/0 = 0 in (5)).
Moreover, Λ̂ is the unique relative growth optimal strategy in the sense that if Λ
is another strategy for investor m such that its relative wealth rmt is a submartingale
for any initial capital and strategies of the other investors, then Λ̂ and Λ are equal in
realization until the time τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : rmt = 1}.
It is easy to see that the proportion of wealth that Λ̂ keeps in the bank account
is 1 − |Λ̂(χt−1)| = ζt(Ct−1(χt−1))/Ct−1(χt−1). In particular, if ρt = 0 for all t, then
Γt = ∅ and ζt = 0. In this case we obtain the same strategy that was found by
Amir et al. (2013) – it divides the available budget between the assets proportionally
to their expected relative payoffs
∫
R
N
+
xn/|x|Kt(dx) = E(Xnt /|Xt| | Ft−1). When ζt 6= 0,
the strategy Λ̂ still divides the budget between the assets proportionally to their payoffs
but the proportions are adjusted for the amount of capital kept in the bank account.
Before we proceed to the proof of Theorem 1, let us state one auxiliary inequality
that we will use (it generalizes Gibbs’ inequality).
Lemma 2. Suppose α, β ∈ RN+ are two vectors such that |α|, |β| ≤ 1 and for each n it
holds that if βn = 0, then also αn = 0. Then
α(lnα− ln β) ≥ ‖α− β‖
2
4
+ |α| − |β|, (6)
where we put αn(lnαn − ln βn) = 0 if αn = 0.
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Proof. We follow the lines of the proof of Lemma 2 in Amir et al. (2013), which estab-
lishes the above inequality in the case |α| = |β| = 1. Using that lnx ≤ 2(√x − 1) for
any x > 0, we obtain
α(lnα− ln β) = −
∑
n :αn 6=0
αn ln(βn/αn) ≥ 2
∑
n
(αn −
√
αnβn)
=
∑
n
(
√
αn −
√
βn)2 + |α| − |β|.
Then we can use the inequality (
√
x−√y)2 ≥ (x−y)2/4, which is true for any x, y ∈ [0, 1],
and obtain (6).
Proof of Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, assume that the strategy Λ̂ is used by
investor 1. Let λt denote the realization of this strategy, and λ˜t the realization of the
representative strategy of the other investors, which we define as the following weighted
sum of the realizations of their strategies:
λ˜nt =
∑
m≥2
rmt−1
1− r1t−1
λm,nt , (7)
where λ˜t = 0 if r
1
t−1 = 1. By Yt we will denote the wealth of investor 1, by Y˜t :=∑
m≥2 Y
m
t the total wealth of the other investors, and by rt = Yt/(Yt + Y˜t) the relative
wealth of investor 1. Then Yt satisfies the following relation, which follows from (2):
Yt = ρt(1− |λt|)Yt−1 +
∑
n
λnt Yt−1
λnt Yt−1 + λ˜
n
t Y˜t−1
Xnt . (8)
Observe that from the definition of Λ̂ and condition (1), it follows that for each t and
almost all ω we have
Kt(ω, {x : ρt(ω)(1− |λt(ω)|) + xλt(ω) = 0}) = 0. (9)
In particular, this implies that Yt > 0 a.s. for all t.
Introduce the predictable sequence of random vectors Ft with values in R
N
+ which
have the components
Fnt =
λnt
rt−1λnt + (1− rt−1)λ˜nt
,
where 0/0 = 0. Denoting the total wealth of the investors by Wt = Yt+ Y˜t, the equation
(8) can be rewritten as
Yt =
(
ρt(1− |λt|) + FtXt
Wt−1
)
Yt−1. (10)
A similar equation is true for Y˜t, namely, Y˜t = (ρt(1 − |λ˜t|) + F˜tXtWt−1 )Y˜t−1, where F˜nt =
λ˜nt /(rt−1λ
n
t + (1− rt−1)λ˜nt ). Using this, we obtain
Wt =
(
ρt(1− rt−1|λt| − (1− rt−1)|λ˜t|) + |Xt|
Wt−1
)
Wt−1. (11)
In this equation we used the equality (rt−1F
n
t + (1 − rr−1)F˜nt )Xnt = Xnt : on the set
{λnt > 0} this is clear from the definition of Fnt and F˜nt , while on the set {λnt = 0} we
have Xnt = 0 a.s., which follows from the construction of Λ̂.
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Let ζt(ω) denote the predictable sequence ζt(ω,Wt−1(ω)). As follows from the defini-
tion of Λ̂, we have |λt| = 1−ζt/Wt−1. Let ζ˜t = (1−|λ˜t|)Wt−1. Then dividing (10) by (11)
we find that ln rt− ln rt−1 = ft(Xt), where ft = ft(ω, x) is the Ft−1⊗B(RN+ )-measurable
function
ft(x) = ln
(
ζtρt + Ftx
rt−1ζtρt + (1− rt−1)ζ˜tρt + |x|
)
(for brevity, the argument ω will be omitted). Note that (9) implies ζtρt + FtXt > 0
a.s., hence we can define the value of ft(ω, x) for x such that ζt(ω)ρt(ω) + Ft(ω)x = 0
in an arbitrary way. It will be convenient to put ft(ω, x) = 0 for such x.
To show that ln rt is a submartingale, it will be enough to show that
∫
R
N
+
ft(x)Kt(dx) ≥
0, i.e. E(ft(Xt) | Ft−1) ≥ 0. Indeed, then ln rt will be a generalized submartingale1,
but since it is bounded from above (by 0), this will also imply that ln rt is a usual
submartingale (see Chapter 7.1 in Shiryaev (2019)).
Suppose for some t, ω, a vector x is such that ζt(ω)ρt(ω)+Ft(ω)x > 0, and, for each
n, the equality Fnt (ω) = 0 implies x
n = 0. Then we have the bound
ft(x) = ln
(
ζtρt + Ftx
ζtρt + |x|
)
+ ln
(
ζtρt + |x|
rt−1ζtρt + (1− rr−1)ζ˜tρt + |x|
)
≥ x lnFt
ζtρt + |x| +
(1− rt−1)(ζt − ζ˜t)ρt
ζtρt + |x| := gt(x) + ht(x),
where we put xn lnFnt = 0 if F
n
t = 0. Here, for the first term in the second line we used
the concavity of the logarithm, and for the second term the inequality ln a ≥ 1− a−1.
For each t, we have Kt({x : ζtρt + xFt = 0}) = 0 a.s. by (9), and also Kt({xn =
0}) = 1 a.s. on the set {Fnt = 0} by the definition of Λ̂. Hence∫
R
N
+
ft(x)Kt(dx) ≥
∫
R
N
+
gt(x)Kt(dx) +
∫
R
N
+
ht(x)Kt(dx) := I
g
t + I
h
t . (12)
For the integral Igt , using Lemma 2, we find
Igt = λt lnFt = λt(lnλt − ln(rt−1λt + (1− rt−1)λ˜t))
≥ 1
4
(1− rt−1)2‖λt − λ˜t‖2 + (1− rt−1)(|λt| − |λ˜t|).
(13)
For the integral Iht , on the set {ω : (ω,Wt−1(ω)) ∈ Γt} we can use the equality∫
R
N
+
ρtWt−1/(ζtρt + |x|)Kt(dx) = 1, and on its complement the equality ζt = 0 and
inequality
∫
R
N
+
ρtWt−1/|x|Kt(dx) ≤ 1, which result in
Iht ≥ (1− rt−1)(ζt − ζ˜t)/Wt−1 = (1− rt−1)(|λ˜t| − |λt|). (14)
Relations (12)–(14) imply
∫
RN
+
ft(x)Kt(dx) ≥ 0, so ln rt is a submartingale, which proves
that λ̂ is relative growth optimal.
In order to prove the statement about uniqueness, suppose there exists another
strategy Λ′ (without loss of generality, assume this is a strategy of investor 1) with
1Recall that a sequence St is called a generalized submartingale if E|S0| <∞ and E(St | Ft−1) ≥ St−1
for all t ≥ 1 (but not necessarily E|St| < ∞). It is easy to show that if St ≤ Ct for all t with some
integrable random variables Ct, then St is integrable, and hence a usual submartingale.
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relative wealth r1t being a submartingale for any initial capital and strategies of the other
investors, and there exist strategies Λ2, . . . ,ΛM and a vector of initial capital Y0 such that
the realizations of Λ̂ and Λ′ are different for the strategy profiles L̂ = (Λ̂,Λ2, . . . ,ΛM )
and L′ = (Λ′,Λ2, . . . ,ΛM ), i.e. P(λ̂t 6= λ′t) > 0 for some t, where λ̂t(ω), λ′t(ω) are the
realizations of the strategy of the first investor in the markets L̂ and L′, respectively.
Consider the predictable stopping time σ = inf{t ≥ 1 : λ̂t 6= λ′t} and define the new
strategies Λ˜m, m ≥ 2, by
Λ˜mt (ω, χt−1) = (Λ
′)mt (ω, χt−1)I(t < σ(ω)) + Λ̂
m
t (ω, χt−1)I(t ≥ σ(ω)),
where χt−1 = (y0, λ1, . . . , λt−1) denotes history of the market until t − 1. Observe
that since {σ ≤ t} ∈ Ft−1, the strategies are well-defined (i.e. Ft−1 ⊗ B(RM+ ×∆t−1)-
measurable).
Let rt(ω) denote the realization r
1
t (ω, Y0, L˜) of the relative wealth of investor 1 when
the investors use the strategy profile L˜ = (Λ′, Λ˜2, . . . , Λ˜M ). Then, on one hand, on the
set {σ <∞} we have E(rσ | Fσ−1) ≥ rσ−1 by the choice of Λ′, and hence E(ln(1− rσ) |
Fσ−1) ≤ ln(1− rσ−1) by Jensen’s inequality. On the other hand, E(ln(1− rσ) | Fσ−1) ≥
ln(1 − rσ−1) since investors m ≥ 2 use the strategy Λ̂ after σ. Hence, on the set
{σ <∞, rσ−1 < 1} we have
0 = E
(
ln
1− rσ
1− rσ−1
∣∣∣∣ Fσ−1
)
≥ 1
4
r2σ−1‖λσ − λ˜σ‖2, (15)
where the inequality can be obtained from (13) and (14). In this formula, λσ and λ˜σ are
the realizations of investor 1’s strategy Λ′ and the representative strategy of investors
m ≥ 2 at time σ in the market with the strategy profile L˜ . It is not hard to see that
on the set {σ <∞} they are equal, respectively, to λ′σ and λ̂σ. Consequently, (15) and
the choice of σ imply that if the set {σ < ∞, rσ−1 < 1} had positive probability, then
rσ−1 = 0 a.s. on it. But this is impossible since up to σ−1 the realization of the strategy
Λ′ coincides with the realization of Λ̂, and hence its relative wealth stays positive. Thus,
P(σ <∞, rσ−1 < 1) = 0, which proves the claimed uniqueness.
4. The dominance property of a relative growth optimal strategy
The next short result shows that the relative wealth of the relative growth optimal strat-
egy tends to 1 on the set of outcomes ω for which the realization λ˜ of the representative
strategy of the other investors is asymptotically different from the realization of Λ̂ in
a certain sense (λ˜ is defined in (7) above). This result can be viewed as asymptotic
uniqueness of a survival strategy.
Theorem 2. Suppose investor 1 uses the relative growth optimal strategy. Let λ̂t de-
note its realization, λ˜t denote the realization of the representative strategy of the other
investors, and Ω′ ∈ F be the set
Ω′ =
{
ω :
∑
t≥1
‖λ̂t(ω)− λ˜t(ω)‖2 =∞
}
.
Then r1t (ω) → 1 a.s. on Ω′. In particular, ‖λ̂t(ω) − λ˜t(ω)‖ → 0 a.s. on the set {ω :
limt→∞ r
1
t (ω) < 1}.
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Proof. We will use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1. Since ln rt is a
non-positive submartingale, it converges a.s. and its compensator Ct converges a.s. as
well. From the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that
Ct − Ct−1 =
∫
R
N
+
ft(x)Kt(dx) ≥ 1
4
(1− rt−1)2‖λ̂t − λ˜t‖2.
Then on the set Ω′ we necessarily have rt → 1 a.s., since otherwise Ct would diverge.
5. Maximization of the growth rate of wealth
Recall that in a single-investor market model a nume´raire portfolio is a strategy such
that the ratio of the wealth of any other strategy to the wealth of this strategy is a super-
martingale. The term “nume´raire portfolio” was introduced by Long (1990); often it is
also called a growth optimal strategy, or a benchmark portfolio (see Hakansson and Ziemba
(1995); Karatzas and Kardaras (2007); Platen (2006)). It is well-known that nume´raire
portfolios have a number of optimality properties: they maximize the asymptotic growth
rate of wealth, maximize the expected logarithmic utility, minimize the time to reach a
given wealth level, etc. (see, e.g., Algoet and Cover (1988); Breiman (1961) for results in
discrete time, and Karatzas and Kardaras (2007) for results in a general semimartingale
model, including a connection with the arbitrage theory). In this section we will show
that the relative growth optimal strategy in our model has similar properties.
By the asymptotic growth rate of the wealth Yt we call lim supt→∞
1
t
lnYt (see, e.g.,
Chapter 3.10 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998)), and the t-step growth rate at time s can
be defined as 1
t
E(ln Ys+t
Ys
| Fs). These notions have especially clear interpretation in a
single-investor model with i.i.d. asset returns: then the log-returns of a growth optimal
strategy are i.i.d. as well, and the asymptotic growth rate and the t-step growth rate
are equal and non-random.
Theorem 3. Suppose investor 1 uses the relative growth optimal strategy and the other
investors use arbitrary strategies. Then for any vector of initial capital Y0 the following
claims are true.
1) Investor 1 maximizes the asymptotic growth rate of wealth: for any m
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
lnY 1t ≥ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
lnY mt a.s. (16)
2) Suppose there are only two investors (M = 2) and E|Xt| <∞ for all t. Then investor
1 maximizes the t-step growth rate of wealth: for any t, s ≥ 0
E
(
ln
Y 1s+t
Y 1s
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
≥ E
(
ln
Y 2s+t
Y 2s
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
a.s. (17)
(In inequalities (16), (17), the both sides may assume the values ±∞; in (17) we put
ln 0/0 = −∞.)
Proof. 1) As was noted above, if investor 1 uses the relative growth optimal strategy,
then inft r
1
t > 0 a.s., and hence suptWt/Y
1
t <∞. Therefore, supt Y mt /Y 1t <∞ for any
m. This implies that for any sequence Tt such that limt→∞ Tt = +∞ (in particular, for
Tt = t) we have the inequality
lim sup
t→∞
1
Tt
ln
Y mt
Y 1t
≤ 0 a.s.
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From here, one can obtain (16).
2) From the condition E|Xt| < ∞, it follows that E lnWt < +∞ for all t. On the
set {ω : E(lnWs+t | Fs)(ω) = −∞} we have E(lnY 1s+t | Fs) = E(lnY 2s+t | Fs) = −∞, so
inequality (17) holds on this set. On the set {ω : E(lnWs+t | Fs)(ω) > −∞}, use the
submartingale property of ln r1t , which implies
E
(
ln
Y 1s+t
Y 1s
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
≥ E
(
ln
Ws+t
Ws
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
.
Since r2t = 1 − r1t is a supermartingale, ln r2t is a generalized supermartingale, so, in a
similar way,
E
(
ln
Y 2s+t
Y 2s
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
≤ E
(
ln
Ws+t
Ws
∣∣∣∣ Fs
)
,
which proves (17).
Remark 2. 1. It is clear from the proof that (16) holds if investor 1 uses any survival
strategy.
2. Note that the second claim of Theorem 3 generally does not hold in the case
M ≥ 3. For example, it can happen that investor 1 uses the strategy Λ̂, investor 2 acts
in an unoptimal way, and investor 3 manages to find a strategy which is better than Λ̂.
A simple example can be constructed even for a non-random market. Let M = 3,
N = 1, Y m0 = 1 for m = 1, 2, 3, and ρ1 = 1, X1 = 1. Then we have λ̂1 = 1/3. However,
if λ11 = λ̂1 and λ
2
1 = 1, then the strategy λ
3
1 = 0 turns out to be better than λ
1
1 after one
step: Y 11 = 11/12, but Y
3
1 = 1.
6. Growth of wealth when investors use the relative growth optimal
strategy
It is interesting to observe that using the relative growth optimal strategy does not
necessarily imply “favorable” asymptotics of the absolute wealth.
We begin with an example which shows that the wealth of an investor who uses the
strategy Λ̂ may vanish asymptotically because the other investors use “bad” strategies
such that the total wealth Wt vanishes. At the same time, there is a strategy the wealth
of which does not vanish, but it is not relative growth optimal. In the second part of this
section, we investigate the case when all the investors use the relative growth optimal
strategy; in that case their wealth will normally grow.
Example 1. We consider a non-random model with two investors and one asset. Sup-
pose the investors have the initial capital Y 10 = Y
2
0 = 1 and use the strategies that invest
the proportions λ1t+1 =
1
2 and λ
2
t+1 =
1
2 +
1
2t in the asset in each time period. Suppose
ρt = 1 for all t, and the (non-random) payoff sequence Xt is defined by
Xt+1 =
Y 1t + Y
2
t
2
.
This equation together with the wealth equation (2) uniquely define the sequences Y 1t ,
Y 2t , and Wt = Y
1
t + Y
2
t :
Y 1t+1 = Y
1
t
(
1
2
+
Xt+1
Y 1t + (1 +
1
t
)Y 2t
)
, Y 2t+1 = Y
2
t
(
t− 1
2t
+
(1 + 1
t
)Xt+1
Y 1t + (1 +
1
t
)Y 2t
)
,
Wt+1 =Wt − Y
2
t
2t
. (18)
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It is easy to see that we have ζt(Wt−1) = Wt−1/2, and hence λ̂t = 1/2. Thus, the
strategy of the first investor is relative growth optimal.
Let, as always, rmt = Y
m
t /Wt, m = 1, 2. According to Theorem 1, there exists the
limit r2∞ = limt→∞ r
2
t ∈ [0, 1). We will now show that r2∞ > 0 and W∞ = 0. From (18),
we find
r2t+1 = r
2
t (1− αt), where αt =
r2t (1− r2t )
2t2 + tr2t − (r2t )2
.
It is easy to see that αt ∈ (0, 1) and αt = O(t−2) as t → ∞. Hence, there exists the
limit r2∞ > 0. Also, from (18) we have Wt+1 =Wt(1− r2t /(2t)). Since
∑
t r
2
t /t =∞, we
have W∞ = 0.
However, there is a trivial strategy that guarantees that the wealth does not vanish:
λt = 0 for all t. 
Now we turn to analysis of the situation when all the investors use the relative growth
optimal strategy. Obviously, in this case the relative wealth of the investors will stay
constant. Our goal will be to investigate the asymptotics of the total wealth Wt.
To avoid uninteresting complications, let us assume from now on that ρt(ω) > 0 for
all t, ω. Introduce the discounting sequence
Dt = ρ1 · . . . · ρt, D0 = 1,
and denote by W ′t =Wt/Dt the discounted wealth of the investors, and by X
′
t = Xt/Dt
the discounted payoffs.
First, we will show that W ′t does not decrease in the sense that W
′
t is a generalized
submartingale. But then one can ask the question: will W ′t asymptotically grow to
infinity (provided that
∑
t |Xt| = ∞)? The answer turns out to be quite interesting.
We consider it only in the case when the discounted payoffs X ′t are i.i.d., and show that
W ′t → ∞ if Xt are truly random (i.e. the support of the distribution of Xt contains
more than one point), while W ′t stays bounded if X
′
t are non-random.
Theorem 4. Suppose all the investors use the strategy Λ̂. Then the following claims
are true.
1) The sequence 1/W ′t is a supermartingale, W
′
t is a generalized submartingale, and
there exists the limit W ′∞ := limt→∞W
′
t ∈ (0,∞] a.s.
2) Assume additionally that ρt = ρ > 0 for all t, where ρ is a constant; X
′
t is a
sequence of i.i.d. random vectors; and the filtration F is generated by Xt, i.e. Ft =
σ(Xs, s ≤ t). If Xt are not equal to a constant vector a.s., then W ′∞ =∞ a.s.; otherwise
W ′t =W0 ∨ |X1|/ρ for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. From (11) we find that W ′t satisfies the equation
W ′t = (1− |λ̂t|)W ′t−1 + |X ′t| (19)
(here λ̂t denotes the realization of the relative growth optimal strategy).
To simplify the proof, let us first show that it can be reduced to the case when ρt = 1
for all t. Indeed, consider the two markets: the first one is defined by the sequences X
(1)
t ,
ρ
(1)
t and initial capital Y
(1)
0 > 0, while the second one by the sequencesX
(2)
t = X
(1)
t /D
(1)
t ,
ρ
(2)
t = 1, and Y
(2)
0 = Y
(1)
0 . Assume all the investors in the both markets use the relative
growth optimal strategy. Denote the total wealth in these markets by W
(1)
t and W
(2)
t ,
respectively.
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It is not hard to see that Γ
(2)
t = {(ω, c/D(1)t−1(ω)) : (ω, c) ∈ Γ(1)t }, and ζ(2)t (ω, c) =
ζ
(1)
t (ω, cD
(1)
t−1(ω))/D
(1)
t−1(ω). From this and (5), by induction, we find that λ̂
(2)
t = λ̂
(1)
t
and W
(2)
t =W
(1)
t /D
(1)
t . Thus, the discounted wealth in the original market specified by
Xt and ρt will be the same as the wealth in the market specified by X
′
t and ρ
′
t = 1. So,
from now on we may assume ρt = 1 and X
′
t = Xt, W
′
t =Wt for all t.
From (9), it follows that Wt > 0 for all t. Let Vt = 1/Wt. From (19), we find
Vt
Vt−1
=
1
1− |λ̂t|+ Vt−1|Xt|
=
Wt−1
ζt(Wt−1) + |Xt| ,
where we used that 1 − |λ̂t| = Vt−1ζt(Wt−1). By the construction of ζt, we have
E(Vt/Vt−1 | Ft−1) ≤ 1, hence Vt is a generalized supermartingale, and, hence, a usual
supermartingale since it is non-negative. This also implies that Wt is a generalized sub-
martingale (via the identityWt = exp(− lnVt) and Jensen’s inequality). Moreover, since
a non-negative supermartingale has a finite limit, there exists V∞ = limt Vt ∈ [0,∞) a.s.,
and consequently there exists W∞ ∈ (0,∞] a.s. This finishes the proof of the first claim
of the theorem.
To prove the second claim, we will need the following auxiliary result on convergence
of positive supermartingales, which is a corollary from Proposition 7.1 in Karatzas and Kardaras
(2007). Suppose St is a strictly positive scalar supermartingale, and consider the gen-
eralized supermartingale Zt defined by
∆Zt := Zt − Zt−1 = St
St−1
− 1, Z0 = 0.
Denote by At the compensator of Zt. Let h(x) = x
2 ∧ |x| and introduce the predictable
sequence Ht by
∆Ht = E(h(∆Zt) | Ft−1), H0 = 0.
Then we have
{ω : lim
t→∞
St(ω) = 0} = {ω : lim
t→∞
(At(ω) +Ht(ω)) =∞} a.s.
We will apply this result to St = Vt, so that
∆Zt =
Wt−1
ζt(Wt−1) + |Xt| − 1.
Observe that since Xt are i.i.d. random vectors, the function ζt(ω, c) and the conditional
distribution Kt(ω, dx) can be chosen not depending on ω, t, hence we will write them
simply as ζ(c) and K(dx). Then ∆Ht = g(Wt−1) with the function
g(c) =
∫
R
N
+
h
(
c
ζ(c) + |x| − 1
)
K(dx), c > 0.
It is not hard to check that g(c) is continuous on (0,∞). Moreover, if Xt are non-
constant (so the support of K(dx) contains more than one point), then g(c) > 0 for all
c > 0. Therefore, g(c) is separated from zero on any compact set B 6∋ {0}. So, on the
set {ω : limtWt(ω) < ∞} we have H∞ = ∞ a.s., which implies P(limtWt < ∞) = 0 in
the case when Xt are non-constant.
When Xt are constant, Xt ≡ X ∈ RN+ , it is easy to see from the definition of ζ that
(1− |λ̂t|)Wt−1 = ζ(Wt−1) = (Wt−1 − |X|)+.
Then (19) implies Wt =Wt−1 ∨ |X|, and, hence, Wt =W0 ∨ |X|.
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Example 2. The proved result leads to an observation, which at first seems counter-
intuitive: if Xt and X˜t are two sequences of payoffs such that Xt ≥ X˜t for all t, it may
happen that the wealth of investors will grow faster under the smaller sequence X˜t.
As an example, let ρt ≡ 1 and Xt ≡ X ∈ RN+ \ {0} be the same constant vector,
while X˜t = Xξt, where ξt ∈ [0, 1] are i.i.d. non-constant random variables. Then, if all
the investors use the relative growth optimal strategy, under the sequence Xt the wealth
becomes W0 ∧ |X| after t = 1 and stop growing, but it grows to infinity under X˜t.
This can be explained by that the presence of randomness in X˜t prevents the investors
from “betting too much”.
7. Conclusion
We studied a model of a market where several investors compete for payoffs yielded by
short-lived assets. The main result of the paper consists in proving that there exists
(and is unique) an investment strategy – the relative growth optimal strategy – such
that the sequence of its relative wealth is a submartingale for any strategies of competing
investors.
This strategy has a number of other optimality properties. It forms a symmetric
Nash equilibrium when all the investors maximize their expected relative wealth. It
is also a survival strategy in the sense that its relative wealth always stays separated
from zero with probability one on the whole infinite time interval. Moreover, its relative
wealth tends to 1 if the representative strategy of the other investors is asymptotically
different from it. It is also shown that the relative growth optimal strategy posses
properties similar to growth optimal strategies (nume´raires) in single-investor market
models, in particular, it maximizes the asymptotic and t-step growth rate of wealth.
Our paper extends the model of Amir et al. (2013) to a market with a bank account
(or a risk-free asset). Inclusion of a bank account in the model leads to interesting analy-
sis of the asymptotics of the absolute wealth of investors. In particular, it turns out that
the relative growth optimality (or survival) property of a strategy does not necessarily
imply that its absolute wealth will grow if the competitors use “bad” strategies.
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